Revenue Sharing: A Problem of Federalism in Brazil

Vol. 20 No. 4 (2000)

Oct-Dec / 2000
Published October 1, 2000
PDF-English
PDF-English

How to Cite

Nunes, Ricardo da Costa, and Selene Peres Nunes. 2000. “Revenue Sharing: A Problem of Federalism in Brazil”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 20 (4):501-20. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572000-1374.

Revenue Sharing: A Problem of Federalism in Brazil

Ricardo da Costa Nunes
From the National Treasury Secretariat/Ministry of Finance, working at the International Affairs Secretariat/ Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management, and getting a PhD in Economics from Universidade de Brasília – UnB, Brasília/DF, Brasil.
Selene Peres Nunes
From the National Treasury Secretariat/Ministry of Finance, working at the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management as Economic Adviser to the Minister, and getting a PhD in Economics from Universidade de Brasília – UnB. Brasília/DF, Brasil.
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20 No. 4 (2000), Oct-Dec / 2000, Pages 501-520

Abstract

This paper shows that the extension and inefficiency of federalism in Brazil is
mostly associated with gaps in the competence to tax, as well as to distortions in the system
of transfers to States and Local Governments, respectively known as State Participation
Fund – SPF and Municipal Participation Fund – MPF. We discuss the concepts of fiscal
federalism and decentralization and suggest changes that could contribute to a better distribution of resources and to fiscal discipline.

JEL Classification: E21; E22; H77.


Keywords: Fiscal federalism intergovernmental relations taxation