The Bretton Woods Agreement and historical evidence. The post-war international financial system

Vol. 9 No. 4 (1989)

Oct-Dec / 1989
Published October 1, 1989
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))

How to Cite

Kilsztajn, Samuel. 1989. “The Bretton Woods Agreement and Historical Evidence. The Post-War International Financial System”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 9 (4):538-50. https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31571989-1489.

The Bretton Woods Agreement and historical evidence. The post-war international financial system

Samuel Kilsztajn
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo – PUC. São Paulo/SP, Brasil.
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 9 No. 4 (1989), Oct-Dec / 1989, Pages 538-550

Abstract

The Bretton Woods Agreement reflected the United States’ hegemony in the
postwar period and the dollar was linked to the commodity that has historically represented
international money – gold. Nevertheless, the other developed countries could not allow
currency convertibility until 1958 and in 1960 the dollar crisis was already evident. From
the “dollar shortage” to the dollar crisis, Bretton Woods was in fact only a mirage. The most
significant aspect of the dollar crisis was certainly the development of the Euromoney market.
At the present time, with the “gold standard”, on one hand, and projects for an artificial
currency, on the other, the international monetary system is evolving toward an oligopolar
system.

JEL Classification: N20; N10.


Keywords: Economic history international financial system Bretton Woods