Judiciary and regulatory policy

Vol. 31 No. 4 (2011)

Oct-Dec / 2011
Published October 1, 2011
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))

How to Cite

Silva, Rafael Silveira e, and Álvaro P. S. Costa Júnior. 2011. “Judiciary and Regulatory Policy: Institutions and Preferences from the Perspective of Transaction Costs”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 31 (4):659-78. https://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org/repojs/index.php/journal/article/view/426.

Judiciary and regulatory policy

institutions and preferences from the perspective of transaction costs

Rafael Silveira e Silva
Mestre e doutorando pelo Instituto de Ciência Política da UnB, consultor legislativo do Senado Federal.
Álvaro P. S. Costa Júnior
Diretor de Pesquisas do Instituto de Gestão, Economia e Políticas Públicas — IGEPP, Mestre em Ciência Política pela Universidade de Brasília — UNB.
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 31 No. 4 (2011), Oct-Dec / 2011, Pages 659-678

Abstract

Increasingly, judges and the courts appear as actors capable of affecting the trajectory of the government decisions, as strategic agents in the policy process. This paper presents an analytical model able to clearly and objectively measure the impact of judicial review in the design of policies in the sphere of economic regulation. Underlying the model is the concept of transaction costs, through which one can raise the levels of intervention of the judiciary in regulatory policy. In addition to the analytical model, the article demonstrates that the interaction between the heterogeneity of preferences in the courts and institutional mechanisms of the justice system is capable of generating greater coordination and cooperation than expected.

JEL Classification: K12; K23; K41; P46.


Keywords: Judiciary regulatory policy judicialization transaction costs