The effects of Central Bank independence and the rate of turnover on the Brazilian inflation

Vol. 26 No. 4 (2006)

Jul-Sep / 2006
Published July 1, 2006
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))
PDF-Portuguese (Português (Brasil))

How to Cite

Mendonça, Helder Ferreira de. 2006. “The Effects of Central Bank Independence and the Rate of Turnover on the Brazilian Inflation”. Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 26 (4):552-63. https://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org/repojs/index.php/journal/article/view/615.

The effects of Central Bank independence and the rate of turnover on the Brazilian inflation

Helder Ferreira de Mendonça
Professor do Departamento de Economia da UFF e pesquisador do CNPq.
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 26 No. 4 (2006), Jul-Sep / 2006, Pages 552- 563

Abstract

Nowadays, the belief is strong in the Brazilian federal government that operational central bank independence is a basic condition to assure price stability. The literature concerning this subject highlights that a high degree of independence and a low turnover of central bank governor are associated with low inflation. This paper analyzes the relation between central bank independence and inflation in Brazil during 1980-2002. The findings denote that there is no effect on inflation due to an increase in degree of independence and a fall in turnover rate.

JEL Classification: E58.


Keywords: central bank independence inflation turnover of central bank governors