This note is an attempt at providing a background for understanding some problems of the negotiations between Brazil and the IMF. The rules of the adjustment game under the current international economic order are discussed first. Then an evaluation is made of the role played by the Fund, and of its tendency to “overkill” in the drawing of adjustment programs. Examples of this are provided by an analysis of the second letter of intent submitted by Brazil to the Fund.
This paper proposes a critical evaluation of the technological standards recently imposed on Brazilian agriculture and suggests alternative strategies for technology policies for small producers. Initially, a diagnosis is made of the situation and characteristics of the peasant sector in Brazil and the impacts of agricultural modernization on this sector of agri-culture. In this diagnosis, there is also a concern to reveal that the institutional organization for the generation and diffusion of agricultural technology by the public sector tends to reinforce the penalties imposed by the economic system on the small agricultural producers. The last part of this work deals with an analysis of possible modernization strategies for small producers. In this part, there is a concern to reintroduce the “technological issue”, revealing that a discussion of the appropriation of the results of increased produc-tivity brought about by modernization is more important than technological adequacy problems.
The international financial boom of the past 20 years presents features that, especially in comparison with past experience, have given rise to a number of analytical confusions. The first is that contemporary international finance is above or beyond the nation state; yet the form of today’s Euromarkets is due largely to the impact of state policy, and the markets hold together largely because of the implicit or explicit presence of the major states — especially the principal guarantor of the system, the United States. The second major error is to see Third World debt either as evidence of the success of developing countries’ inexorable march toward full economic autonomy, or as evidence of their total loss of economic independence. In fact, foreign borrowing has strengthed the hand of the domestic states and of the elites that support it and are supported by it, providing funds essential for the constitution of an integrated national economy. At the same time, however, this borrowing can place major constraints on the debtor country, especially in periods of economic troubles. Contemporary international finance thus rests on strong support from the advanced capitalist countries’ nation-states — a support which is now clearly aroding — and upon an implicit partnership between lending banks and borrowing countries — a partnership now being strained to the breaking point by increasingly onerous demands their creditors are making on the heavily indebted developing countries.
The article analyzes the concept of state monopoly capitalism and its application to the current stage of capitalism in Brazil. The first part surveys the theoretical literature, from Lenin’s original formulation to recent developments bu French and Soviet authors, and sums up the main criticism to the concept. It suggests also the emphasis on the capital internalization process as an alternative analytical approach for the understanding of modern capitalism. In the second part, the article questions those authors who consider that the concept of state monopoly capitalism provides an ade-quate framework for the analysis of Brazilian capitalism.
The diffusion of nuclear technology means more a development of a large network of activities (e.g., capital goods, construction, metallurgical and chemical industries) than a path for solving energy problems. Its ties with the arms race cause specific non-proli-feration problems. A dose state-capital articulation emerges, which strengthens the subsumption of labour and introduces new processes of social control. Already ful-filled investments give impulse to this tendency. The Tlatelolco regime, banishing nuclear weapons from Latin America, seems to establish a pre-condition for a regional solution to the problems thus arising. But, besides the imperfect adhesion to the Treaty, technical and political reasons obstruct a regional integration of the nuclear fuel cycle. Among other things, a lack of regional integration in other industries makes nuclear expansion more dependent on extra-regional techno-logical ties.